



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
AIR FORCE LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT CENTER (AFLCMC)  
CRYPTOLOGIC AND CYBER SYSTEMS DIVISION  
JOINT BASE SAN ANTONIO-LACKLAND, TEXAS 78243-7081

22 September 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR AFLCMC/HNCO

Attn: Lt Col Jared M. Ekholm

FROM: AFLCMC/HNCKC

3133 General Hudnell Dr., Suite 210  
San Antonio, TX 78226-1885

SUBJECT: Inquiry of Security Incident

1. Authority. An inquiry was conducted under the authority of your letter, DoDM 5205.07V1, DoD Special Access Program (SAP) Security Manual; DoDM 5200.1V3, DoD Information Security Program; AFI 16-1404, Air Force Information Security Program and Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information or Controlled Unclassified Information on DoD Information Systems.

2. Matters Investigated. The basis of this inquiry entails the alleged failure to follow proper industrial security procedures and guidelines for the reporting of and obtaining the required acknowledgement of a sub contractual relationship. The scope of my inquiry was limited to Dr. [REDACTED] access to classified information while performing as a subcontractor to Global InfoTeck (GITI) on the FB project under the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) Excalibur contract.

3. Personnel Interviewed.

- a. GG-14, Mr. Daniel D. Brown, AFLCMC/HNCRYD
- b. GG-12, Mr. Richard A. Ranft, AFLCMC/HNC-DOS
- c. Major William M. McVeigh, AFLCMC/HNCO

4. Findings. Testimony provided to and observations of the inquiring official revealed:

a. Maj McVeigh indicated that Dr. [REDACTED] was the Chief/Lead Data Scientist for National Security Agency (NSA)-Texas, prior to his resignation. I obtained email traffic from Ms. Tanya Marcina, Cyber Assurance Branch, AFRL that describes Dr. [REDACTED] NSA duties as building a data science team, training and equipping them with the tools they need to solve mission problems in Enterprise Discovery Operations.

b. Moreover, Maj McVeigh mentioned that Dr. [REDACTED] was/is also a subcontractor to the prime contractor GITI for FB, an effort funded by AFLCMC/HNCO. In this capacity, Dr. [REDACTED] performed as a sub-contractor to GITI for unclassified mathematics consultant services. Because Dr. [REDACTED] work was unclassified, there was no DD Form 254/SCI nomination for Dr. [REDACTED] under the GITI prime contract for FB.

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c. Mr. Dan Brown, Cyber Engineer, stated that Dr. [REDACTED] briefed the FB concepts to the Air Force due to NSA lack of interest. Sometime in Fiscal Year 2019, after the AF funded FB, Dr. [REDACTED] began work as a sub-contractor consultant to GITI while maintaining his position with NSA-Texas as Chief/Lead Data Scientist. On multiple occasions, as an NSA official, Dr. [REDACTED] has given/attended classified briefings on the status of FB which is the same effort that he performs mathematics consultant services as a sub-contractor to GITI. However, as a NSA official, Dr. [REDACTED] maintained the proper security clearance for access to the above mentioned program.

d. Finally, discussion with Mr. Richard Ranft, Government SAP Security Officer, revealed that Dr. [REDACTED] had visited the Cyber Warfare Mission Systems Program Office on multiple occasions. However, each occasion was as an official NSA government employee with the proper security clearance for access to the above mentioned program.

5. Conclusion. As a result of the testimony and personal observations, it is concluded that:

a. Pursuant to DoDM 5200.01-V3, DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information, dated July 28, 2020 and Standard Operating Procedures, AFLCMC/HNCO: AF-19-005, dated April 2, 2019 security incidents are a failure to comply with security regulations that could result in a security violation of security infraction. Furthermore, a security violation is defined as any incident that involves the loss or suspected compromise of classified material or probable disclosure of such material to an unauthorized person. While a security infraction is any other incident that is not in the best interest of security, which does not involve loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified material.

a. Dr. [REDACTED] when accessing classified program information was acting in an official capacity as an NSA employee with the proper clearances. Conversely, when acting in the capacity as a sub-contractor Dr. [REDACTED] did not need nor have access to classified information as indicated by AFRL. Therefore, no compromise of classified information occurred.

6. Recommendations. No corrective actions recommended to prevent future incidents as no incident occurred. This inquiry met the criteria of neither a security violation nor security infraction and should not be classified as such.

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 RICHARD R. BREMER, GG-14, DAF  
 Inquiry Official

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